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This study investigates how the degree of book-tax conformity affects managers’ compensation contracts and 
earnings management activity. The arguments for and against requiring book-tax conformity have been 
discussed in many countries for many years. There are several empirical studies about the effects of book-tax 
conformity on the usefulness of accounting earnings, but the existing literature on the impact of book-tax 
conformity on earnings management presents ambiguous results. Further, there are few studies that have 
examined the relationship between the degree of book-tax conformity and managers’ compensation contracts. 
This study focuses on this research gap. In this result, I set multi-task principal-agent model in theoretical part 
and OLS in empirical part to analysis the relationship between book tax conformity and earnings management. 
The results showed that the bonus coefficient decreases with the degree of book-tax conformity, demonstrating 
that book-tax conformity can indirectly affect compensation contracts. The main findings of the study are as 
follows: book-tax conformity prevents managers from engaging in earnings management activity as well as 
some production activities; and the expected utility of the principal decreases with the degree of book-tax 
conformity. that the results of this study can provide policy makers with information on the determine of the 
book tax conformity system. 
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This paper investigates how the degree of book-tax conformity affects managers’ compensation contracts and 
earnings management activities. According to OECD, there is the widespread perception that “the rules for the 
taxation of cross-border activities are regularly broken, and that taxes are paid only by the naive. Multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) stand accused of dodging taxes all around the world.”1 Many MNEs, including Google, 
Apple, Facebook, and Amazon (sometimes known as GAFA), take advantage of the different rules of taxation 
between countries. For example, there are two prevailing tax reporting systems. The first requires book-tax 
conformity, and the other allows taxable income to be different from reported accounting earnings. Book-tax 
conformity is required in Japan, but not in the United States. In addition, in order to calculate tax income in the 
EU, some member states use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), some use Local Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and others use a separate tax GAAP. The arguments for and against 
requiring book-tax conformity have been discussed in many countries for many years. However, there are few 
studies that have examined the relationship between the degree of book-tax conformity and managers’ 
compensation contracts and earnings management activities. This study expands upon the current research on 
book-tax conformity to address this gap. 
 
Proponents of book-tax conformity insist that increases in conformity can reduce aggressive financial reporting 
and excessive tax planning, and, as a result, improve the earnings quality and strengthen tax compliance. It is 
argued that increased conformity leads to a considerably simpler tax system that would constrain managers' 
opportunism (Slemrod and Blumenthal 1996; Yin 2001; Desai 2005; Whitaker 2005). Desai (2005) argues that 
low book-tax conformity has contributed to the simultaneous degradation of profit reporting to capital markets 
and tax authorities because it allows managers to mischaracterize tax savings to capital markets, and 
mischaracterize profits to tax authorities. 
 
On the other hand, opponents of book-tax conformity claim that it impairs earnings quality, and, accordingly, 
leads to less informative earnings information than otherwise (Hanlon and Shevlin 2005; Hanlon et al. 2005, 
2008). They argue that it results in lower earnings quality because tax authorities, and other stakeholders, 
require different kinds of information. If information is aligned to one measure, the quality of information for 
investors and other financial statement users will be reduced. Because a tax system is designed to meet the 
government objectives, such as increasing governmental revenue, the government can provide economic 
incentives or disincentives for taxpayers to engage in particular activities, and reward particular constituencies. 
In contrast, a financial accounting system typically provides managers with some incentive to convey more 
information so as to mitigate information asymmetry between the managers and other constituents. Thus, the 




opponents insist that book-tax conformity impairs the usefulness of earnings information, and, therefore, believe 
it is detrimental to the investors’ decision-making ability. 
 
The arguments for and against requiring book-tax conformity have been discussed in many countries for many 
years. There are several empirical studies about the effects of book-tax conformity on the usefulness of 
accounting earnings, but the existing literature on the impact of book-tax conformity on earnings management 
presents ambiguous results. Further, there are few studies that have examined the relationship between the 
degree of book-tax conformity and managers’ compensation contracts. This study focuses on this research gap. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature review. Section 3 describes the theoretical 
model setting and analysis. Section 4 describes the empirical research design. Section 5 discusses the sample 
selection and test results. Section 6 presents the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Some empirical studies address the relationship between book-tax conformity and earnings management. 
Atwood et al. (2010) found that higher conformity is related to lower earnings persistence and a lower 
association between earnings and future cash flows. The empirical measure of book-tax conformity developed 
by Atwood et al. (2010) has already been applied to study the impact of conformity on earnings management. 
For instance, Blaylock et al. (2015) concluded that greater absolute earnings management is connected with 
stronger book-tax conformity. Watrin et al. (2014) used an alternative specification of the measure for Europe, 
and showed the same conclusion. In contrast, Tang (2015) associated higher mandatory conformity with lower 
levels of earnings management and tax avoidance. Leuz et al. (2003) did not find any significant relationship 
between the degree of a country’s book-tax conformity and earnings management with sample of public firms. 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) documented that higher conformity is associated with greater earnings management for 
private firms. Moreover, Coppens and Peek (2005) presented evidence of European private firms not avoiding 
the reporting of small losses in countries that had high book-tax conformity. If taxable income and financial 
statement earnings are well-aligned, it is expected that private firms would respond more to a change in the 
corporate tax rate than public firms would, and that this response is expected to be seen indirectly in the 
financial statements. 
 
Some theoretical studies analyze the relationship between disclosure regulations and earnings management. 
Murakami and Shiiba (2015) found that accounting regulations directly affected relative costs of accrual-based 
and real earnings management in both static and dynamic settings. Murakami and Ohta (2011) compared the 
value relevance of earnings information under the book-tax conformity reporting and decoupling settings. They 
report that the market has more precise information in the conformity setting than in the decoupling setting. 
Also, previous studies have examined corporate tax avoidance in a Linear, Exponential, and Normal (LEN) 
model, but the results were ambiguous (Chen and Chu 2005; Crocker and Slemrod 2005; Ewert and Niemann 
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2014). However, there are few theoretical research studies that examined the relationship between the degree of 
book-tax conformity and managers’ earnings management. This paper develops a simple model to examine this 
relationship directly, and, by extension, address this gap. Moreover, it also tests the impact of book-tax 
conformity on earnings management using cross-country data in the empirical analysis section. 
 
3. Theoretical Model  
 
3.1 Model description 
A multi-task principal-agent model, in which the risk-neutral principal owns a firm, was developed. The firm is 
operated by a manager who reports the firm’s earnings. The manager chooses an unobservable production effort 
𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 that produces actual cash flow or unmanaged earnings 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝, where 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝 is an uncertainty regarding 
the cash flow that is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2. These unmanaged earnings are not 
available as a performance measure. 
 
Besides the production activity, the manager can take actions that increase or decrease unmanaged earnings. 
These actions include an earnings management activity, 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 + 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒, where 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒 is an uncertainty regarding the 
reported earnings that is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2. The earnings management 
activity has an upward bias in unmanaged earnings. In this paper, it is assumed that 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 is the degree of 
book-tax conformity, and that it has a direct impact on taxable income such that 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 ≤ 1 is satisfied. 
 
The firm’s reported earnings are written as 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒, and taxable income is written as 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 = 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 . In 
the perfect conformity case, 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 = 1, and taxable income equals reported earnings. Managers’ actions entail 
convex psychological costs 𝑐𝑐�𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝; 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒� = �𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝2 + 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒  𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒2�/2 for the manager, where 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 and 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 are 
coefficients of the marginal costs “production cost” and “earnings management cost,” respectively. In other 
words, these coefficients reflect the difficultly, or costs, of each action. The cost of taking productive action is 
assumed to be different from that of distorting the reported earnings, and production cost is assumed to be 
higher than earnings management cost (𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 > 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒). 
 
The manager is risk- and effort-averse, and the managers’ utility functions consist of a compensation w and 
activity costs, that is, 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀 = −exp [−𝜌𝜌(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)], where 𝜌𝜌 represents a constant coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion. 
 
The compensation contract is assumed to be linear in managers’ performance and is based on the after-tax 
earnings. Therefore, in the conformity case, the managers’ compensation takes the form: 
𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀 = γM + 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 − 𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓),     (1) 
where 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀 is a fixed compensation, 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀 is a bonus coefficient, and t is a corporate tax rate that satisfies 





For unobservable managerial activities, the principal can offer performance-based compensation contracts to 
motivate the manager into providing the desired activity levels. In this case, the optimal contract solves the 
following problem: 
max𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀,𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀 𝐸𝐸 [𝑥𝑥 − 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 − 𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀]    (2) 
s.t. 𝐸𝐸[𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀] − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝜌𝜌/2 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀2 �(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2 + (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)2𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2� ≥ 0   (PC) 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = argmax𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  𝐸𝐸 [𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀] − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝜌𝜌/2 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀
2 �(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2 + (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)2𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2� , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑝𝑝, 𝑒𝑒}  (IC) 
The principal’s utility is equal to the cash flow that is determined by unmanaged earnings minus the tax expense 
that is based on the taxable income minus managers’ compensation. In other words, although managers’ 
earnings management do not affect the unmanaged earnings, the result for earnings management may affect real 
cash flow via tax payments. (PC) is a manager’s participation constraint. The left-hand side of (PC) is a 
manager’s certainty equivalent of compensation 𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀 and effort costs. 
 







      (3) 
In the optimum, again, (PC) is binding so that the expected compensation can be written as 𝐸𝐸[𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀] = 𝑐𝑐 +
𝜌𝜌/2 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀2 �(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2 + (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)2𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2�. Substituting this condition and (IC) into the principal’s utility function, 
and differentiating it with respect to 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀, shows that the first order conditions derive the following optimal 
bonus coefficient and level of activities: 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀∗ =
𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1−𝑡𝑡)2−𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)2+𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1−𝑡𝑡)2+ 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝜌𝜌�(1−𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2+(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2�
    (4) 
𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝∗ =
(1−𝑡𝑡)[𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1−𝑡𝑡)2−𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)]
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝�𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)2+𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1−𝑡𝑡)2+ 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝜌𝜌�(1−𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2+(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2��
,            (5) 
𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒∗ =
(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)[𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1−𝑡𝑡)2−𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)]
𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒�𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)2+𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1−𝑡𝑡)2+ 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝜌𝜌�(1−𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2+(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2��
.            (6) 
 
It is assumed that 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 < 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2/[𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡 (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)] so the bonus coefficient and activity levels are positive. 




= 〈𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡�𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)2 −  𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒  𝜌𝜌�(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2(1 − 2 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝  𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2 + (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)�(1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡) 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 −
2(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒�𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2��〉/�𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒  𝜌𝜌 �(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2 + (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2��




= 〈(1 − 𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡�𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)2 −  𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒  𝜌𝜌�(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2(1 − 2 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2 + (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)�(1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡) 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 −
2(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒�𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2��〉/�𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒  𝜌𝜌 �(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2 + (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2��






= 𝑡𝑡�𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒2 (1 − 𝑡𝑡)2𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝜌𝜌�(1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)2𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2 − (1 − 𝑡𝑡)2𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2� − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝2(1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)4 − 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒2(1 − 𝑡𝑡)4 + 2 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝  𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2 −
(1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝2 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒  𝜌𝜌�(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2 (1 − 3 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡)𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2 + (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)3𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2��/𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒�𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1 − 𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝  𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒  𝜌𝜌 �(1 −
𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2 + (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐  𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2��
2 < 0.      (9) 
 
The result derives the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. If the production cost is relatively low � 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1−𝑡𝑡)
2
[𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡 (1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)]
> 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 > 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒�, the optimal production and 
earnings management activities 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝∗ , 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒∗ , respectively, and the optimal bonus coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀∗  always decrease 
with the degree of book-tax conformity. 
 
Proposition 1 states if the cost production cost is sufficiently low, the production and earnings management 
activities, and the bonus coefficient decrease with the degree of book-tax conformity. The intuition of 
Proposition 1 is as follows. An increase in the degree of book-tax conformity has several effects on the 
principal’s utility. First, according to Equation (3), the increase in the degree of book-tax conformity leads to a 
decrease in the levels of earnings management activities, but not in the production activities. This makes the 
principal set have relatively low incentive because the marginal impact of increasing 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀∗  decreases due to the 
degree of book-tax conformity. Second, the impact of the degree of book-tax conformity purely increases tax 
expense. This effect decreases the bonus coefficient. Third, the increase in the degree of book-tax conformity 
increases the compensation volatility for the manager. This effect decreases the bonus coefficient because the 
manager is risk averse. All things considered, the impact of the degree of book-tax conformity affects managers’ 
earnings management activity and bonus coefficient directly. This effect decreases managers’ production 
activity, coinciding with most of the current literature. Atwood et al. (2010) found that the higher conformity is 
related to lower earnings persistence. Proposition 1 shows that a higher conformity is related to lower 
production activity, which may lead to lower earnings persistence. Further, Desai (2005) and Tang (2015) 
associated higher conformity with lower levels of earnings management. 
 
Substituting Equations (4)–(6) into the binding (PC), the expected utility of the principal 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃 was derived as 
follows: 
𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃∗ =
�𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1−𝑡𝑡)2−𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)�
2
2 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝�𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)2+𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1−𝑡𝑡)2+ 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝜌𝜌�(1−𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2+(1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2��
.          (10) 




〈−𝑡𝑡 �𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1− 𝑡𝑡)2 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡(1− 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)��𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(1− 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)3(1 + 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 𝜌𝜌 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2)− 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 (1− 𝑡𝑡)2[𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 𝜌𝜌(1− 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡)𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2] + 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 𝜌𝜌(1− 𝑡𝑡)2(1− 2 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2�〉
�𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒�𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1− 𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(1− 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 𝜌𝜌 �(1− 𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝2 + (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)2 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2��
2� 
 
< 0.                (11) 
This result derives the following proposition. 
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Proposition 2. If the production cost is relatively low � 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1−𝑡𝑡)
2
[𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡 (1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)]
> 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 > 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒�, the expected utility of the 
principal always decreases with the degree of book-tax conformity. 
 
As mentioned above, the degree of book-tax conformity has an indirect impact on managers’ production activity 
via the bonus coefficient. 
 
The change in managers’ activities according to the degree of book-tax conformity is analyzed next. According 
to Proposition 1, if the production cost is sufficiently low, the managers’ optimal production and earnings 
management activities 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝∗ , 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒∗ , respectively, always decrease with the degree of book-tax conformity. A 





< 1             (12) 
The result derives the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. If the production cost is relatively low � 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(1−𝑡𝑡)
2
[𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡 (1−𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡)]
> 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 > 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒�, the degree of production 
activity is never higher than the degree of earnings management activity.  
 
Increases in the degree of book-tax conformity leads to the degree of earnings management being relatively low. 
The ratio of production activity to earnings management activity shows that production activity will never be 
higher than the earnings management activity because of the effort cost. In this paper, it is assumed that the cost 
of production activity is higher than that of earnings management activity. Therefore, the manager has more 
incentive to engage in earnings management activities. Though, when there is an increase in the degree of 
book-tax conformity, managers’ incentive to engage in earnings management decreases. According to Equation 
(12), the degree of book-tax conformity will only affect the denominator of the ratio. As mentioned above, the 
degree of book-tax conformity impacts the managers’ earnings management activity both directly and indirectly, 
while the book-tax conformity impacts the managers’ production activity indirectly, via the bonus coefficient. 
Overall, when the degree of book-tax conformity increases, the degree of earnings management decreases. 
 
4. Empirical Research Design 
 
4.1 Hypotheses development 
Prior international studies found that earnings persistence, and the association between earnings and future cash 
flows, are lower when book-tax conformity is higher (Atwood et al. 2010). Watrin et al. (2014) showed that 
higher book-tax conformity yields greater downward earnings management. Also, as the Proposition 1 in 
Section 3 shows, managers’ earnings management activities decreases with the degree of book-tax conformity. 
Therefore, the following was hypothesized: 




Assuming book-tax conformity has a negative impact on earnings management, this study next explores how 
book-tax conformity affects managers’ compensation contracts. Gaertner (2014) was extended by including the 
degree of book-tax conformity. In traditional principal-agency models, the principal pays the manager a risk 
premium to encourage him or her to accept the compensation contract. In fact, CEOs who are compensated 
after-tax bear significant additional risks associated with the tax accounts. Thus, the possibility of exogenous 
changes in the tax rate introduces significant compensation risks to CEOs paid on an after-tax basis (Newman 
1989). The higher the book-tax conformity, the lower the compensation risk to CEOs, so the principal can pay a 
lower risk premium to the manager. Also, as Proposition 1 in Section 3 shows, the bonus coefficient of 
managers’ compensation decreases with the degree of book-tax conformity. Therefore, the following was 
hypothesized:  
H2: The degree of book-tax conformity is negatively associated with CEO compensation. 
 
4.2 Resign design and sample selection 
4.2.1 Book-tax conformity measure 
Atwood et al. (2010) defined book-tax conformity measures as the amount of variation in current tax expense 
that is not captured by the variation in pre-tax income, in any given country-year. Countries that allow greater 
flexibility in the reporting of taxable income, given a particular level of pre-tax income, have lower book-tax 
conformity. Thus, to keep in line with Atwood et al. (2010), book-tax conformity is calculated by estimating the 
conditional variance of current tax expenses from the following model, estimated by country-year: 
CTEt = θ0 + θ1 PTBIt + θ2ForPTBIt + θ3DIVt + et,               (13) 
where CTE is current tax expense2, t is the year indicator, PTBI is the pre-tax book income, ForPTBI is the 
estimated foreign pre-tax book income (foreign tax expense / total tax expense x PTBI)3, DIV is the total 
dividends, and e is a disturbance term with mean zero. CTE, PTBI, ForPTBI, and DIV are divided by lagged 
total assets to control for cross-sectional scale differences. The measure of book-tax conformity is calculated as 
the scaled ranking of the root mean squared errors (RMSEs) obtained from country-year estimates of Equation 
(13). 
Like Atwood et al. (2010), when a higher RMSE corresponds to lower book-tax conformity, vice versa, the 
analysis uses descending ranks (i.e., the highest RMSE in a given year is ranked 0, and the lowest is ranked n - 1, 
where n is the number of included countries in that year), then divides them by n - 1 to scale the rankings so that 
they range between zero and one. The higher ranks on the book-tax conformity measure indicates higher 
conformity. 
As a robustness test, Watrin et al. (2014) was followed to calculate book-tax conformity by calculating the 
                                                     
2 All financial variables are drawn from Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Capital IQ platform.  
3 Like Atwood et al. (2010), the database does not break pre-tax book income into its domestic and foreign 
components, nor does it break foreign tax expenses into its current and deferred components. ForPTBI is the 
foreign percentage of pre-tax book income as foreign tax expense/total tax expense. 
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absolute value of permanent book-tax differences for each country-year: 
PermBTDi,t  = PTBIi,t − (Taxationi,t/ TaxRatek,t),                (14) 
where PermBTD is the permanent book-tax difference, t is the year indicator, i is the firm indicator, Taxation is 
the total taxation4, and TaxRate is the corporate tax rate of the country k5. Like Watrin et al. (2014), the mean of 
all the absolute values of permanent book-tax differences in one country in a given year was taken, and a rank 
assigned to each country in each year based on PermBTDi,t in Equation (14). Also, the analysis uses 
descending ranks (i.e., the highest RMSE in a given year is ranked 0 and the lowest is ranked n - 1, where n is 
the number of included countries in that year), then divides them by n - 1 to scale the rankings. The final scaled 
rank is calculated as the average rank over a 10-year period (2008–2018). 
 
4.2.2 Earnings management measure 
Following prior literature, discretionary accruals were used as a proxy for accrual-based earnings management. 
In this study, the discretionary accruals, based on the Jones model in Equation (15), were modified in Equation 
(16) (Dechow et al. 1995). The abnormal accruals were also based on the Jones model in Equation (17), and 
augmented for net income (Kothari et al. 2005) as the measure of earnings management in Equation (18). The 
discretionary accrual is estimated cross-sectionally each country-year using all firm-year observations in the 
same two-digit SIC code6: 
    TAit = ι0 + ι1(1/ASSETit−1) + ι2ΔSALESit + ι3PPEit + νit,            (15) 
TAit = κ0 + κ1(1/ASSETit−1) + κ2(ΔSALESit − ΔARit) + κ3PPEit + ξit,         (16) 
 TAit = λ0 + λ1(1/ASSETit−1) + λ2ΔSALESit + λ3PPEit + λ4ROAit + 𝜋𝜋it,       (17) 
TAit = μ0 + μ1(1/ASSETit−1) + μ2(ΔSALESit − ΔARit) + μ3PPEit + μ4ROAit + τit,   (18) 
where TAit is the total accruals as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities, 
excluding the current portion of long-term debts, minus depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged total 
assets; t is the year indicator; i is the firm indicator; ASSET is the total assets; ΔSALESit is the change in sales 
scaled by lagged total assets; PPEit is net property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets; ΔARit 
is the change in accounts receivables scaled by lagged total assets; and ROAit is net income scaled by lagged 




                                                     
4 Total taxation is the sum of current and deferred tax expenses of firm i in year t. Like Watrin et al. (2014), all 
the financial variables are scaled by lagged total assets.  
5 The tax rate of country k in year t are taken from KPMG’s Corporate Tax Rate Table (see 
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.ht
ml). 




4.3 Test for CEO compensation and the association between book-tax conformity and earnings 
management 
CEO compensation and the association between book-tax conformity and earnings management was tested 
using the cross-section of firm-year observations. To mitigate the influence of error terms that are correlated 
across firms; across time and across country, I follow the recommendation in Petersen (2009) by estimating all 
regression models using ordinary least squares(OLS), using standard errors clustered by industry, and including 
year fixed effects . Specifically, the following models (with country and firm subscripts suppressed) were 
estimated: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 =
𝜙𝜙0 + 𝜙𝜙1 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙2𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙3𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙4𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙5𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝜙6 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙7𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝜙𝜙8𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝜙9 𝐽𝐽𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙10𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙11𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙12𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙13𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙14𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝜙𝜙15𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝜙16,𝑗𝑗 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓_𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + ∑ 𝜙𝜙17,𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷_𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 +
∑ 𝜙𝜙17,𝑘𝑘 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷_𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 + 𝜐𝜐𝑡𝑡,                 (19) 
𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜒𝜒0 + 𝜒𝜒1 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒4𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒5𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒6𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜒𝜒7𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 +
𝜒𝜒8𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒9 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜒𝜒10𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒11𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒12𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒13𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒14𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒15𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 +
𝜒𝜒16𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜒𝜒17𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒18𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝜒𝜒19,𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓_𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 +
∑ 𝜒𝜒20,𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷_𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + ∑ 𝜒𝜒20,𝑛𝑛 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷_𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡,      
 (20) 
where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 is the discretionary accruals, and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 is the measure for book-tax conformity.  
 
Based on H1 and the result of Proposition 1, if firm-years with higher conformity are associated with greater 
(downward) earnings management, 𝜙𝜙1 < 0 is predicted. The following dummy variable was inserted: 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 
equals 1 if discretionary accruals are negative, and 0 otherwise. The measure of book-tax conformity interacts 
with this indicator variable to empirically assess how much higher or lower the discretionary accruals are when 
book-tax conformity changes. Consistent with the expectation that higher book-tax conformity is associated 
with greater downward earnings management, compared with lower book-tax conformity, 𝜙𝜙3 > 0 was 
predicted.  
 
Several controls and fixed effects were used because accounting research has identified numerous factors that 
affect earnings management behaviors. The controlling for statutory tax rate (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶) variable is to ensure that the 
book-tax conformity measure is not just reflecting differences in statutory tax rates that exist across different 
countries (Atwood et al. 2010). Controlling for leverage (𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉) is based on the assumption that managers are 
more likely to use discretion in accounting as they offset tightening debt-covenant constraints (Sweeny 1994). 
Also, control for loss (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) was included because of the incentive to manage earnings in order to avoid 
reporting losses.  
 
Regarding the firm size (𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸), positive accounting theory postulates that large firms engage in greater earnings 
management than small firm do because of the differences in political costs (Watts and Zimmerman 1978). The 
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market-to-book ratio (𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶) was used to control for growth. In addition to judicial independence and 
shareholder interests, investor protection was used to determine country-specific effects, as prior research has 
shown that investor protection has a negative influence on the magnitude of earnings management (Leuz et al. 
2003; La Porta et al. 1998). Also, prior research shows that the Big 8 audit firms constrain earnings management 
through discretionary accruals (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991; Becker et al. 1998), but, according to the period of 
the sample, a Big 4 dummy variable (𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶) was used to control the auditor type between the largest four 
audit firms. Also, Zang (2012) found that firms with longer operating cycles (𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸) have greater flexibility 
for accrual management because they have larger accrual accounts and a longer period for accruals to reverse. 
Furthermore, the industry and year fixed effects were controlled. 
 
Equation (20) estimates how book-tax conformity affects CEO compensation (𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃). In this study, the natural 
log of CEO cash compensation and total board member cash compensation was the dependent variable7. Based 
on H2 and the result of Proposition 1, if firm-years with higher conformity are associated with less 
compensation through greater downward earnings management, then 𝜒𝜒1 < 0 is predicted. The following 
dummy variable was inserted: 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 equals 1 if pre-tax incomes are negative, and 0 otherwise. ROA and RET 
were included because they are important determinants of cash compensation (Sloan 1993). Also, the standard 
deviation of incomes and stock returns are to control for risks in earnings dependent compensation (Gaertner 
2014). Controlling for firm size (𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸) is based on political costs, as larger firms face more scrutiny on CEO 
pay than smaller firms do (Leone et al. 2006). Several control variables that prior research have shown were also 
included. 
 
4.4 Sample selection 
The group structure data, financial data, and compensation data were drawn from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
Capital IQ platform. All firm-year observations from 2007 to 2018 were obtained from the necessary data to 
compute the earnings management and book-tax conformity measure. Following the prior literature, all 
observations with missing SIC code and financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999), and regulated industries (SIC 
4400-5000) were excluded from the sample. All firm-year observations from countries that do not have at least 
40 usable firm-year observations, which is a less stringent data availability criterion than previous research used, 
were deleted. To mitigate the influence of outliers, the top and bottom 0.5% of each year were winsorized. To 
test Equation (20), the firm-year observations with missing compensation data were removed. The sample 
selection procedure yields 163,195 firm-year observations from 34 countries to test Equation (19), and 38,988 
firm-year observations from 34 countries to test Equation (20). 
Table 1 lists the sample countries and country-specific averages from the results of estimating Model (13) and 
(14). Also, it presents the average RMSE, average BTD, average Corporate tax rate (CTR) for each country, as 
well as the number of years, N(years) and the number of firms, N(firms), that each country appears in the 
sample. The countries are sorted from high to low average book-tax conformity (Watrin et al. (2014) measure).  
                                                     
7 Cash compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, and non-equity incentive. 
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As corporate tax rate increases, book-tax conformity decreases. In other words, when the statutory tax rate is 
high, firms have higher incentives for tax planning. As the result, high statutory tax rate countries have a 
relatively high BTD (indicating low book-tax conformity). The relationship between statutory tax rate and 
RMSE is shown to be similar.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of equation (19), the means of EM group are near zero. 
The mean of BTC(A) and BTC(W) are 0.469 and 0.555, because the rank of two book-tax conformity measures 
are different. For example, the average Wartin et al. (2014) measure of Japan is 0.8672, but under the average 
Atwood et al. (2010) measure is 0.1746, also the number of firms of Japan is 2,642 per year. This different 
causes the different in the mean of BTC(A) and BTC(W). Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the 
sample of equation (20), due to the difficulty of collecting data, the number of data of dependent variable 
LNCOMP is only 51,251. As the result the sample size of regression of equation (20) is 38,988. This 
phenomenon has been seen in many previous studies related to CEO compensation. The mean of ROA and 
ROAt-1 are -0.039 and -0.035, but the median 0.026 and 0.027. Although the distribution of ROA and ROAt-1 
are left-skewed, the impact on the analysis is not big. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 4 presents the correlation between the sample of equation (19). First the correlation between EM group 
and BTC are all negative (p<0.01), the correlation between BTC and CTR are all negative (p<0.01). The 
correlation between EM group and LOSS are all positive (p<0.01), that means when a firm have a loss after tax, 
manager will have more incentive to manage the earnings. The correlation between EM group and ROA also 
show the same result. Table 5 presents the correlation between the sample of equation (20). First the correlation 
between LNCOMP and BTC are all negative (p<0.01). Also, the correlation between CTR and ROA are 
negative. That means when the statutory corporate tax rate is high, firm will have less incentive to make a higher 
profit. About the correlation between SIZE and ROA is positive (p<0.01) and correlation between SIZE and 
STDROA, RET and STDRET are all negative (p<0.01), big firm can raised a good performance in such scale 
effect, on another hand, the performance is more stable and the stock price is relatively low. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5. Results 
The results reported in Table 6 and 7. Table 6 address the effect of book tax conformity on earnings 
management. Regarding the signed values of discretionary accruals (Table 6, Panel A) and absolute values of 
discretionary accruals (Table 6, Panel B), the coefficients of book tax conformity (𝛷𝛷1) are all significant 
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negative8. Thus, as book tax conformity increases, earnings management decreases for positive discretionary 
accrual firms, consistent with H1. Simultaneously, as book tax conformity increases, downward earnings 
management increases. As the result, when book tax conformity increase, earnings management (absolute 
values of discretionary accruals) will decrease. The result is different from Wartin et al. (2014), but in this study, 
I included more control variable for the cost of earnings management. Also, the result from theoretical part had 
shown that when the degree of book-tax conformity increases, manager will have less incentive to manage 
earnings. The second regression (Table 7) examines the impact of book tax conformity on CEO compensation 
(H2). I find that book tax conformity is associated with significantly less CEO compensation (𝜒𝜒1 < 0). Even 
though I had already included some firm performance as the control variables, the coefficients are still negative, 
consistent with H2. About the relationship between firm’s performance and CEO compensation, the result 
shows that the coefficients of ROA, ROAt-1 and STDRET are negative, on other hand, coefficients of STDROA, 
RET and RETt-1 are positive. Rego and Wilson (2009) also reported the similar result. They estimated US data 
from 1996 to 2001 and their results showed that the relationship between CEO compensation and RET is 
positive but the relationship between ROA and compensation is not significant. As in equation (1), Total 
compensation can be divided into fixed compensation and bonus. For the part of fixed compensation, no matter 
firm have a loss or profit, it will not be negative. In general, the fixed compensation of a big firm is higher, if 
more big firms have a loss, the coefficients of ROA may be negative. Compare with ROA, investor focus on 
RET because of the investment return. So, the coefficients of RET is positive. Simultaneously, the coefficient of 
STDRET show that investors do not prefer uncertainty. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Regarding the increase in elaborate international tax shelter strategies during early 2000s, the internationally 
agreed standards of transparency and exchange of information in tax area ensured consistent and effective 
implementation of international transparency standards. However, BEPS is still a big issue on the political 
agenda because of the aggressive tax planning by multinational enterprises (MNEs). This paper investigated 
how the degree of book-tax conformity affects managers’ compensation contracts and earnings management 
activity by using theoretical and empirical model simultaneously. This paper found that the bonus coefficient 
decreases with the degree of book-tax conformity. The main findings are as follows: book-tax conformity 
prevents the manager from engaging in earnings management activity as well as some production activities, as 
the result, the CEO compensation will be relatively decrease; and the expected utility of the principal decreases 
with the degree of book-tax conformity. These findings are supported by theoretical and empirical test. Some of 
these results are consistent with previous literature and real-world examples. For example, according to Ito 
Review9, the performance and compensation bonus of Japanese companies appears to be considerably lower 
than global standards, especially in countries with lower book-tax conformity, such as the United States. The 
                                                     
8 I got the same result with different book tax conformity measure BTC(W). 
9 See the Ito Review of Competitiveness and Incentives for Sustainable Growth-Building Favorable 
Relationships between Companies and Investors, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Japan (2014). 
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results of this paper provide one reason why compensation contracts are different among countries. Also, Zicke 
and Kiy (2017) founded that the effect of German Accounting Law Modernization Act is a greater amount of 
absolute discretionary accruals. Thus, when the degree of book-tax conformity decrease, earnings management 
activity will become more aggressive. 
In summary, this study shows that book tax conformity can prevents the earnings management activity. 
However, this investigation has some caveats. First, the model in this study had not separate earnings 
management activity and tax aggressiveness. Some theoretical models tested firm’s tax avoidance behavior 
(Ewert and Niemann 2014; Waegenaere et al. 2015). If I add a tax planning or tax avoidance activity into the 
theoretical analysis part, the result may be different. However, the main purpose of this study is to investigate 
the relationship between book-tax conformity affects managers’ compensation contracts and earnings 
management activity by using theoretical and empirical model simultaneously. Generally, BTD is used in many 
studies as the measure of tax avoidance, but it is used in the calculation of book-tax conformity measures BTC. 
Thus, I did not add tax planning or tax avoidance activity into the model. Second, compare with equation (19), 
the number of observations of equation (20) is less than 1/4, only 38,988. Compare with firm’s financial or 
accounting data, the number of available data on CEO compensation is less. Most prior literature on CEO 
compensation faces the same problem. Since the result of this study is useful.  
Using Global data allows me to study countries that employ different systems. Therefore, this study contributes 
to the ongoing debate in many countries regarding whether high book tax conformity is associated with more 
earnings management. Of course, earnings management is one aspect of earnings quality. The results suggest 
that a higher book tax conformity can prevent earnings management. Therefore, the results indicate that U.S. 
should move from a low book tax conformity system to a high book tax conformity system. If mandatory 
application of IFRS is decided by Japanese government, they should keep the high book tax conformity system.  
Overall, this study provides a new aspect for the relationship between book tax conformity and earnings 
management. I build a theoretical model to comprehensively investigate the relationship between book-tax 
conformity affects managers’ compensation contracts and earnings management activity. Prior literature tested 
the relationship between book tax conformity and earnings management or earnings management and CEO 
compensation, respectively. I believe that the results of this study can provide policy makers with information 
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Table 1. Level of Book Tax conformity measures by country 
Country N(years) Avg. BTD 
Avg. RANK 
(Watrin et al.) 
Avg. RMSE 
Avg. RANK 
(Atwood et al.) 
Avg. CTR N(firms) 
Taiwan 11 0.0623 0.9617(1) 0.0103 0.9363(1) 0.1873 1,354 
South Korea 11 0.0712 0.8942(2) 0.0142 0.7593(8) 0.2417 1,368 
Japan 11 0.0678 0.8672(3) 0.0346 0.1746(30) 0.3644 2,642 
Sri Lanka 11 0.0832 0.8186(4) 0.0192 0.5749(16) 0.2873 88 
Egypt 7 0.0745 0.8007(5) 0.0241 0.3848(21) 0.2364 68 
Italy 11 0.0868 0.7465(6) 0.025 0.3584(25) 0.3005 107 
China 11 0.0844 0.7404(7) 0.013 0.7956(6) 0.25 2,525 
Spain 1 0.086 0.7273(8) 0.02 0.4545(19) 0.25 39 
Thailand 11 0.0822 0.7264(9) 0.011 0.8961(2) 0.2391 296 
Vietnam 11 0.0872 0.6835(10) 0.0131 0.7909(7) 0.2355 163 
Pakistan 11 0.0891 0.6808(11) 0.0245 0.3591(24) 0.3364 203 
Turkey 11 0.0882 0.6697(12) 0.0115 0.8788(3) 0.2018 135 
Malaysia 11 0.0885 0.6459(13) 0.0131 0.7964(5) 0.2473 542 
India 11 0.0939 0.5869(14) 0.0259 0.3259(26) 0.3397 2,552 
South Africa 3 0.0998 0.5801(15) 0.0138 0.7404(10) 0.28 41 
Bangladesh 8 0.0941 0.5693(16) 0.0359 0.0981(32) 0.2625 93 
Switzerland 11 0.1407 0.5664(17) 0.0151 0.7106(11) 0.1826 79 
Singapore 11 0.1023 0.5281(18) 0.0186 0.5778(15) 0.1718 219 
Indonesia 11 0.1178 0.518(19) 0.0247 0.3663(22) 0.2573 178 
Finland 7 0.1174 0.4654(20) 0.0182 0.5914(13) 0.2129 43 
Russia 3 0.1168 0.4378(21) 0.0139 0.7566(9) 0.2 41 
Philippines 11 0.1305 0.4373(22) 0.0122 0.8363(4) 0.3045 52 
Germany 11 0.1309 0.3924(23) 0.0195 0.5617(17) 0.296 261 
France 11 0.188 0.2796(24) 0.0531 0(34) 0.333 292 
Netherlands 5 0.198 0.2714(25) 0.0169 0.6475(12) 0.25 42 
Poland 11 0.191 0.2589(26) 0.0357 0.0778(33) 0.19 245 
Norway 8 0.2362 0.2574(27) 0.0204 0.5027(18) 0.2625 45 
Denmark 2 0.217 0.2467(28) 0.0218 0.429(20) 0.22 41 
Sweden 11 0.2786 0.182(29) 0.0275 0.273(27) 0.2411 288 
UK 11 0.3005 0.1555(30) 0.0303 0.1932(29) 0.2345 525 
Israel 11 0.359 0.1326(31) 0.0192 0.5891(14) 0.2505 139 
Australia 11 0.6681 0.0723(32) 0.0318 0.1694(31) 0.3 691 
US 11 1.0826 0.023(33) 0.0275 0.2579(28) 0.3882 1,767 




Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Select Variables: Discretionary Accruals 
 count mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
EM1 205,771 0.020 0.128 -0.357 -0.043 0.008 0.070 0.444 
EM2 205,771 0.020 0.129 -0.364 -0.043 0.007 0.070 0.447 
EM3 205,771 0.000 0.109 -0.391 -0.050 -0.001 0.048 0.365 
EM4 205,771 0.001 0.109 -0.383 -0.050 -0.002 0.048 0.365 
ABSEM1 205,771 0.089 0.094 0.000 0.023 0.055 0.119 0.444 
ABSEM2 205,771 0.090 0.095 0.000 0.023 0.056 0.120 0.447 
ABSEM3 205,771 0.076 0.079 0.000 0.021 0.049 0.101 0.391 
ABSEM4 205,771 0.076 0.079 0.000 0.021 0.049 0.101 0.383 
BTC(A) 205,771 0.469 0.315 0.000 0.188 0.414 0.786 1.000 
BTC(W) 205,771 0.555 0.353 0.000 0.172 0.643 0.897 1.000 
CTR 205,771 0.291 0.069 0.150 0.250 0.280 0.340 0.407 
LEV 205,771 0.465 0.295 0.011 0.257 0.447 0.627 2.212 
LOSS 205,771 0.296 0.456 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LNTA 205,771 18.296 2.253 12.581 16.856 18.343 19.754 23.870 
MBR 178,965 2.558 4.151 -6.232 0.672 1.351 2.826 36.628 
JI 205,771 4.929 0.922 2.230 4.099 4.899 5.829 6.818 
SI 205,771 4.770 0.589 3.035 4.366 4.906 5.244 6.371 
IP 205,771 6.485 1.263 2.000 5.300 6.300 7.300 9.300 
DBIGFOUR 205,771 0.391 0.491 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2.000 
DAUDITCHA 205,771 0.162 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA 205,771 -0.035 0.283 -2.125 -0.020 0.027 0.069 0.343 
CYCLE 186,908 0.251 0.617 -3.472 0.078 0.210 0.383 4.137 
Variable Definitions: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸1 = earnings management in consolidated financial statements of firm measured as signed values of discretionary accruals based on the 
Jones model in Equation (15); 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2 = earnings management in consolidated financial statements of firm measured as signed values of 
discretionary accruals based on the Modified Jones model in Equation (16); 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸3 = earnings management in consolidated financial 
statements of firm measured as signed values of discretionary accruals based on the Performance Jones model in Equation (17); 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸4 = 
earnings management in consolidated financial statements of firm measured as signed values of discretionary accruals based on the 
Performance modified Jones model in Equation (18); 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸1 = earnings management in consolidated financial statements of firm 
measured as absolute values of discretionary accruals based on the Jones model in Equation (15); 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2 = earnings management in 
consolidated financial statements of firm measured as absolute values of discretionary accruals based on the Modified Jones model in 
Equation (16); 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸3 = earnings management in consolidated financial statements of firm measured as absolute values of discretionary 
accruals based on the Performance Jones model in Equation (17); 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸4 = earnings management in consolidated financial statements of 
firm measured as absolute values of discretionary accruals based on the Performance modified Jones model in Equation (18); 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(𝐷𝐷) = 
book-tax conformity of firm as measured by Atwood et al. (2010); 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(𝑊𝑊)= book-tax conformity of firm as measured by Watrin et al. 
(2014); 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶= corporate tax rate of firm as measured by Watrin et al. (2014); 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉= leverage of firm calculated as the sum of liabilities 
divided by lagged total assets; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿= dummy variable of firm equal to 1 if a firm reports a loss after tax,0 otherwise; 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸= size of firm 
calculated as the natural logarithm of firm’s lagged total assets; 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶= market-to-book ratio of firm; 𝐽𝐽𝑆𝑆= judicial independence of firm; 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆= protection of minority shareholder’s interest of firm; 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃= strength of investor protection of firm; 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶= dummy variable of firm 
equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is one of Big 4,0 otherwise; 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷= dummy variable of firm equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor changed 
in previous year, 0 otherwise; 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷= return on asset of firm calculated as the after tax net income divided by lagged total assets; 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸= 






Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Select Variables: Compensation 
 count mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
LNCOMP 51,251 25.976 1.718 20.016 24.927 26.154 27.188 29.343 
BTC(A) 205,771 0.469 0.315 0.000 0.188 0.414 0.786 1.000 
BTC(W) 205,771 0.555 0.353 0.000 0.172 0.643 0.897 1.000 
CTR 205,771 0.291 0.069 0.150 0.250 0.280 0.340 0.407 
LOSS 205,771 0.304 0.460 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ROA 205,771 -0.039 0.271 -2.103 -0.024 0.026 0.066 0.295 
ROAt-1 205,771 -0.035 0.283 -2.125 -0.020 0.027 0.069 0.343 
STDROA 177,611 0.121 0.316 0.002 0.017 0.036 0.083 2.990 
RET 178,988 0.198 0.928 -0.938 -0.276 -0.003 0.359 10.983 
RETt-1 170,586 0.263 0.989 -0.940 -0.236 0.037 0.425 11.000 
STDRET 143,695 0.821 1.070 0.067 0.308 0.516 0.902 10.011 
LEV 205,770 0.543 0.607 0.006 0.269 0.472 0.680 12.983 
CFO 205,771 0.019 0.210 -1.387 -0.015 0.050 0.111 0.478 
MBR 178,965 2.558 4.151 -6.232 0.672 1.351 2.826 36.628 
PPE 205,771 0.322 0.278 0.000 0.104 0.264 0.464 1.781 
INTANG 205,771 0.040 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.740 
INV 205,771 0.133 0.140 0.000 0.015 0.100 0.195 0.754 
SIZE 205,771 18.296 2.253 12.581 16.856 18.343 19.754 23.870 
DBIGFOUR 205,771 0.391 0.491 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2.000 
DAUDITCHA 205,771 0.162 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Variable Definitions:  
𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 = Firm’s CEO compensation calculated as the natural logarithm of CEO compensation; 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(𝐷𝐷) = book-tax conformity of firm 
as measured by Atwood et al. (2010); 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(𝑊𝑊)= book-tax conformity of firm as measured by Watrin et al. (2014); 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶= corporate tax rate 
of firm as measured by Watrin et al. (2014); 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿= dummy variable of firm equal to 1 if a firm reports a loss after tax,0 otherwise; 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷= 
return on asset of firm calculated as the after tax net income divided by lagged total assets; 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷= standard deviation of return on asset 
for the prior four years; 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵= firm’s return; 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵= standard deviation of firm’s return for the prior four years; 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉= leverage of firm 
calculated as the sum of liabilities divided by lagged total assets; 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿= cash flow operations of firm calculated as cash flow operations 
divided by lagged total assets; 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶= market-to-book ratio of firm; 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸= net property, plant and equipment of firm calculated as the net 
property, plant and equipment divided by lagged total assets; 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁= intangible asset of firm calculated as the sum of intangible asset 
divided by lagged total assets; 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉= inventory of firm calculated as the sum of inventory divided by lagged total assets; 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸= size of firm 
calculated as the natural logarithm of firm’s lagged total assets; 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶= dummy variable of firm equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is one 
of Big 4,0 otherwise; 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷= dummy variable of firm equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor changed in previous year, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4: Correlations: Discretionary Accruals 
 EM1 EM2 EM3 EM4 BTC(A) BTC(W) CTR LEV LOSS LNTA MBR 
EM1 1.000           
            
EM2 0.982*** 1.000          
            
EM3 0.713*** 0.697*** 1.000         
            
EM4 0.698*** 0.716*** 0.979*** 1.000        
            
BTC(A) -0.095*** -0.096*** -0.008*** -0.011*** 1.000       
            
BTC(W) -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.025*** -0.031*** 0.496*** 1.000      
            
CTR 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.004 0.007** -0.593*** -0.258*** 1.000     
            
LEV -0.064*** -0.062*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.080*** 0.001 0.131*** 1.000    
            
LOSS 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.052*** 0.056*** -0.156*** -0.342*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 1.000   
            
LNTA -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.057*** -0.057*** 0.114*** 0.233*** 0.037*** 0.075*** -0.349*** 1.000  
            




Table 4 (continued) 
 EM1 EM2 EM3 EM4 BTC(A) BTC(W) CTR LEV LOSS LNTA 
JI 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.023*** 0.025*** -0.574*** -0.454*** 0.278*** -0.067*** 0.253*** -0.074*** 
           
SI 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.016*** 0.018*** -0.386*** -0.413*** 0.170*** -0.071*** 0.215*** -0.079*** 
           
IP 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.024*** 0.026*** -0.373*** -0.466*** 0.325*** 0.004 0.220*** -0.104*** 
           
DBIGFOUR 0.026*** 0.026*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.053*** 0.005* -0.009*** -0.018*** -0.056*** 0.365*** 
           
DAUDITCHA -0.034*** -0.032*** 0.002 0.004 0.017*** 0.050*** 0.006** 0.023*** 0.021*** -0.041*** 
           
ROA -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.062*** -0.065*** 0.157*** 0.328*** -0.064*** -0.174*** -0.556*** 0.372*** 
           




Table 4 (continued) 
 MBR JI SI IP DBIGFOUR DAUDITCHA ROA1 Cycle1 
JI -0.022*** 1.000       
         
SI -0.025*** 0.839*** 1.000      
         
IP -0.067*** 0.421*** 0.471*** 1.000     
         
DBIGFOUR -0.059*** 0.245*** 0.274*** 0.177*** 1.000    
         
DAUDITCHA 0.008*** -0.064*** -0.082*** -0.046*** -0.122*** 1.000   
         
ROA -0.085*** -0.253*** -0.205*** -0.191*** 0.070*** -0.016*** 1.000  
         





Table 5: Correlations: Compensation 
            
 LNCOMP BTC(A) BTC(W) CTR LOSS ROA ROAt-1 STDROA RET RETt-1 STDRET 
LNCOMP 1.000           
            
BTC(A) -0.198*** 1.000          
            
BTC(W) -0.361*** 0.496*** 1.000         
            
CTR 0.123*** -0.593*** -0.258*** 1.000        
            
LOSS -0.141*** -0.147*** -0.345*** 0.043*** 1.000       
            
ROA 0.108*** 0.162*** 0.348*** -0.066*** -0.569*** 1.000      
            
ROAt-1 0.096*** 0.157*** 0.328*** -0.064*** -0.455*** 0.683*** 1.000     
            
STDROA -0.098*** -0.114*** -0.314*** 0.026*** 0.336*** -0.578*** -0.577*** 1.000    
            
RET -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.068*** 0.017*** 0.016*** -0.032*** -0.087*** 0.065*** 1.000   
            
RETt-1 -0.024*** -0.010*** -0.054*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 0.016*** -0.023*** 0.070*** -0.084*** 1.000  
            
STDRET -0.155*** -0.009*** -0.204*** -0.013*** 0.195*** -0.213*** -0.213*** 0.289*** 0.249*** 0.269*** 1.000 
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Table 5 (continued) 
            
 LNCOMP BTC(A) BTC(W) CTR LOSS ROA ROAt-1 STDROA RET RETt-1 STDRET 
            
LEV 0.004 -0.050*** -0.047*** 0.046*** 0.023*** -0.095*** -0.164*** 0.133*** 0.015*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 
            
CFO 0.129*** 0.120*** 0.269*** -0.026*** -0.472*** 0.683*** 0.664*** -0.482*** -0.024*** -0.056*** -0.216*** 
            
MBR 0.080*** 0.027*** -0.087*** -0.034*** 0.006* -0.051*** -0.085*** 0.111*** -0.085*** 0.246*** 0.124*** 
            
PPE -0.093*** 0.029*** -0.036*** -0.021*** 0.055*** 0.072*** -0.002 -0.018*** 0.033*** 0.090*** 0.105*** 
            
INTANG 0.210*** -0.011*** -0.200*** -0.027*** 0.048*** -0.056*** -0.072*** 0.040*** 0.008** 0.018*** 0.002 
            
INV -0.053*** 0.150*** 0.178*** -0.046*** -0.239*** 0.206*** 0.175*** -0.175*** -0.006* 0.027*** -0.062*** 
            
SIZE 0.610*** 0.114*** 0.233*** 0.037*** -0.338*** 0.355*** 0.372*** -0.368*** -0.093*** -0.076*** -0.257*** 
            
DBIGFOUR 0.454*** -0.053*** 0.005* -0.009*** -0.061*** 0.075*** 0.070*** -0.099*** -0.030*** -0.052*** -0.140*** 
            





Table 5 (continued) 
          
 LEV CFO MBR PPE INTANG INV SIZE DBIGFOUR DAUDITCHA 
LEV 1.000         
          
CFO -0.121*** 1.000        
          
MBR 0.046*** -0.124*** 1.000       
          
PPE 0.069*** 0.052*** -0.034*** 1.000      
          
INTANG 0.085*** -0.041*** 0.122*** -0.155*** 1.000     
          
INV 0.142*** 0.088*** -0.009*** -0.070*** -0.061*** 1.000    
          
SIZE -0.051*** 0.373*** -0.082*** 0.003 0.070*** 0.081*** 1.000   
          
DBIGFOUR -0.043*** 0.097*** -0.059*** -0.047*** 0.051*** -0.070*** 0.365*** 1.000  
          





Table 6, Panel A Results of Regressions: Discretionary Accruals 
 Predicted Sign EM1 EM2 EM3 EM4 
Constant  -0.0172 -0.0157 0.0716*** 0.0707*** 
  (-1.31) (-1.21) (12.68) (12.41) 
BTC(A) － -0.0390*** -0.0391*** -0.00969*** -0.0102*** 
  (-7.39) (-7.23) (-4.30) (-4.44) 
DNEG  -0.179*** -0.180*** -0.146*** -0.146*** 
  (-37.70) (-37.54) (-45.51) (-45.63) 
DNEG*BTC + 0.0500*** 0.0490*** 0.0270*** 0.0262*** 
  (8.56) (8.30) (6.53) (6.33) 
LEV  0.00262* 0.00208 -0.00136 -0.00134 
  (1.68) (1.30) (-1.28) (-1.23) 
LOSS  -0.000752 -0.00134 -0.00292*** -0.00280*** 
  (-0.64) (-1.12) (-4.41) (-4.27) 
JI  -0.00793*** -0.00810*** 0.000530 0.0000596 
  (-4.16) (-4.15) (0.72) (0.08) 
SI  0.0126*** 0.0126*** -0.00161 -0.00104 
  (4.84) (4.64) (-1.55) (-1.08) 
IP  0.00727*** 0.00714*** 0.000989*** 0.000926*** 
  (6.50) (6.33) (3.47) (3.22) 
DBIGFOUR  -0.00131* -0.00138* -0.00118*** -0.00131*** 
  (-1.78) (-1.84) (-2.70) (-3.05) 
DAUDITCHA  -0.00437*** -0.00407*** -0.000909* -0.000488 
  (-6.08) (-5.59) (-1.91) (-1.02) 
CYCLE  -0.00267*** -0.00282*** -0.00138*** -0.00125*** 
  (-5.22) (-5.40) (-3.01) (-2.66) 
ROA  0.0124*** 0.0117*** -0.0179*** -0.0186*** 
  (4.14) (3.91) (-8.12) (-8.52) 
LNTA  0.00150*** 0.00154*** -0.000152 -0.0000866 
  (3.85) (3.93) (-1.01) (-0.58) 
MBR  0.000875*** 0.000956*** 0.000330*** 0.000421*** 
  (8.27) (9.04) (4.45) (5.63) 
YEAR fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  163,195 163,195 163,195 163,195 
R^2a  0.474 0.475 0.479 0.480 





Table 6, Panel B Results of Regressions: Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
 Predicted Sign ABSEM1 ABSEM2 ABSEM3 ABSEM4 
Constant  0.0740*** 0.0778*** 0.141*** 0.144*** 
  (4.26) (4.43) (16.50) (16.84) 
BTC(A) － -0.0221*** -0.0225*** -0.00938*** -0.00938*** 
  (-5.72) (-5.68) (-4.38) (-4.41) 
LEV  0.0232*** 0.0231*** 0.0175*** 0.0174*** 
  (15.55) (15.19) (15.82) (15.52) 
LOSS  0.0122*** 0.0126*** 0.00270*** 0.00229*** 
  (11.40) (11.59) (3.90) (3.41) 
JI  -0.0150*** -0.0156*** -0.00705*** -0.00721*** 
  (-6.64) (-6.75) (-5.68) (-5.80) 
SI  0.0161*** 0.0168*** 0.00782*** 0.00783*** 
  (5.03) (5.06) (4.58) (4.66) 
IP  0.00949*** 0.00926*** 0.00284*** 0.00271*** 
  (7.44) (7.21) (5.30) (5.07) 
DBIGFOUR  -0.00446*** -0.00446*** -0.00276*** -0.00273*** 
  (-5.23) (-5.17) (-4.87) (-4.86) 
DAUDITCHA  -0.00278*** -0.00266*** -0.00101 -0.000998 
  (-3.46) (-3.31) (-1.43) (-1.41) 
CYCLE  -0.00195*** -0.00189*** -0.00147*** -0.00154*** 
  (-3.91) (-3.74) (-3.51) (-3.64) 
ROA  -0.0317*** -0.0310*** -0.0298*** -0.0303*** 
  (-12.84) (-12.66) (-13.17) (-13.32) 
LNTA  -0.00372*** -0.00378*** -0.00566*** -0.00573*** 
  (-8.22) (-8.28) (-28.74) (-29.17) 
MBR  0.00197*** 0.00200*** 0.00168*** 0.00173*** 
  (17.99) (18.01) (21.53) (21.75) 
YEAR fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
country fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  163,195 163,195 163,195 163,195 
R^2a  0.127 0.126 0.115 0.114 
      




Table 7, Results of Regressions: Compensation 
 Predicted Sign LNCOMP LNCOMP 
Constant  18.16*** 18.33*** 
  (62.74) (62.82) 
BTC(A) － -1.790***  
  (-18.33)  
BTC(W) －  -1.860*** 
   (-29.94) 
LOSS  -0.307*** -0.108*** 
  (-7.58) (-4.17) 
LOSS*BTC  0.419*** -0.615*** 
  (3.75) (-8.07) 
CTR  0.740*** 0.365* 
  (2.83) (1.74) 
ROA  -0.128*** -0.0252 
  (-3.37) (-0.81) 
ROAt-1  -0.305*** -0.244*** 
  (-8.74) (-8.49) 
STDROA  0.150*** 0.0520** 
  (5.80) (2.50) 
RET  0.0601*** 0.0362*** 
  (5.82) (3.96) 
RETt-1  0.0338*** 0.0395*** 
  (3.72) (4.31) 
STDRET  -0.0344*** -0.0327*** 
  (-4.18) (-4.57) 
LEV  -0.0334** -0.0115 
  (-1.99) (-1.13) 
CFO  -0.191*** -0.149*** 
  (-3.15) (-2.77) 
MBR  0.0273*** 0.0223*** 
  (13.69) (11.89) 
PPE  -0.0611 -0.0142 
  (-1.64) (-0.42) 
INTANG  0.973*** 0.351*** 
  (14.72) (6.06) 
INV  0.0512 0.0945 
  (0.67) (1.37) 
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SIZE  0.415*** 0.416*** 
  (67.79) (72.39) 
DBIGFOUR  0.260*** 0.0856*** 
  (12.95) (4.41) 
DAUDITCHA  -0.113*** -0.0300 
  (-4.74) (-1.42) 
YEAR fixed effect  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect  Yes Yes 
country fixed effect  Yes Yes 
N  38,988 38,988 
R^2a  0.508 0.544 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
